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Abstract
In this paper, a layered security mechanism for IEEE 1687 is proposed using a new class of physically unclonable function
(PUF) called Bimodal PUF. It moves beyond the conventional single-challenge single-response PUF by introducing a second
response to the PUF gained from the same single challenge. As an advantage, a double-response PUF forms two-layer security
solution, one at the hardware layer by limiting the access to the embedded instrument and the second one for the data layer by
securing the output data that needs to be transmitted. Experiments conducted with FPGA show that such advantages come in place
at a small silicon area overhead, up to 1.4%, for a 64-bit security key. This is known to be sufficient enough to resist brute-force
and machine learning attack.
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1. Introduction
According to Moore’s law, the density of transistor packed into Integrated Circuits (ICs) is doubled every 18 months.
Such a rapid shrinking down the size increases the complexity of both VLSI devices and their testing procedures, too.
By such a trend in the fabrication of ASICs, the manufacturer would be able to integrate more IPs into a single device
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as on-chip embedded instruments which makes IPs less accessible by conventional probes. This, in turn, makes the
necessary tests and quality checks more complex and challenging. Hence, it is a key requirement to develop methods
and tools enabling test and characterise the VLSI devices, which is impossible to be done in a short time. From an
economic point of view, while market competitions require manufacturers to release their products quickly, long
testing time means loss of profit and competition in the current challenging market.
The latest industrial solution to overcome the problem is the extension of the existing design for testability, the
IEEE 1149.1 [1] which enables us to employ the boundary scan techniques for testing the instruments integrated with
VLSI devices. This feature makes to widely known the new standard (IEEE 1687 [2]) as internal JTAG (IJTAG). It
uses the same Test Access Port (TAP) controller as JTAG for interfacing Instruments-Under-Test (IUT) with the test
equipment. Although IJTAG was developed from the initial JTAG standard, it did not mean to replace the IEEE
1149.1 or any other standards; but in fact, it complements the others. There are a couple of differences between IJTAG
and JTAG as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. JTAG VS IJTAG Comparison
JTAG (IEEE 1149.1) IJTAG (IEEE 1687)
Board Level Chip Level
Fixed scan chain Dynamic scan chain
BSDL (Boundary Scan Description
Language)
ICL (Instrument Connectivity Language) & PDL
(Procedural Description Language)
IJTAG differs from JTAG in the physical level of the test, scan chain, and description language. With the first one,
JTAG offers solutions to test instruments on the board level while IJTAG is featured explicitly for the testing
instruments on both board and chip levels. The second difference identifies if the access ports support the fixed or
dynamic scan chain. JTAG endorses the fixed scan chain that enables test data to be shifted to all the instrument on
the board under test even if the user only wants to see the connection between two instruments. Hence, JTAG requires
more time for testing even a single instrument, which is not efficient. IJTAG supports dynamic scan chain by
implementing Segment Insertion Bit (SIB) that acts as a gate in front of the instrument on the chip.
Even though there are only a few devices in complying with the IJTAG standard, there is a rising number of studies
being carried out regarding the implementation and security of IJTAG. Instruments embedded the on-chip need to be
secured because the device may contain confidential data, patented IP, or even critical cores that if compromised will
stop the whole system. One of the primary concerns regarding IJTAG security is how to provide secure access to the
instrument on-chip via the IJTAG access port. The malicious party can use this feature for various hardware hacking
or other purposes such as reverse engineering the IP by analysing the outputs when given a particular input vector. It
is also possible to get access to the device and activate hardware Trojan hidden inside the chip.
In this paper, we proposed a novel security mechanism to prevent access to the IJTAG network as well as prevent
access to the output data of the instrument from the unauthorised parties. The properties of a physically unclonable
function (PUF) to create a secret key for SIB is used. The PUF developed to have two responses from a single
challenge. The first response will be used for SIB unlocking and the other one for obfuscating the output data coming
out from the instrument. Linear-Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) was utilised to de-obfuscate the output data. The user
needs to provide a number of cycles to generate a signal from LFSR that match with obfuscation response from PUF.
Therefore, even if the attacker succeeds to unlock the SIB, they still cannot read the real output data if they are failed
to provide the right cycle number to get the de-obfuscation key from LFSR. The previous efforts conducted by other
researchers to avoid unauthorised access to the IJTAG network are discussed in the next section. Section III discusses
a type of PUF used to achieve the proposed security mechanism. Novel IJTAG security protocol will be presented in
section IV, and continued by security analysis in section V. Finally; section VI concludes the paper.
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2. Related Work
Segment Insertion Bit (SIB) is one of the main features that differentiates IJTAG from JTAG. It is a module that
acts as a gate in front of the instrument facilitates IJTAG network to benefits from a dynamic scan chain as can be
seen in figure 1. It has two working states, closing and opening states. The first one blocks the input test data to be
shifted into the instrument, but the other one allows shifting. Hence, testing just two instruments requires opening the
relevant, SIBs of the chosen instruments, and the others remain closed. Therefore, the time necessary to test IJTAG
compliance chip can be done faster compared to the test time of JTAG.
On-chip instruments may contain confidential data such as secret company-designed IP. Hence, the security of the
IJTAG network that provides access to the device is essential. One way to do so is by securing the SIB. Dworwak et
al. conducted initial attempts to develop a security mechanism for IJTAG in 2013 [3] by architecting locking
techniques for the SIB using an n-bit signal. Whoever wants to access the instrument behind SIB needs to present the
right n-bit signal before getting the SIB in open state. If an incorrect key is introduced, the system will stop working
until the next reset be processed by the system administrator. This doubles the time needed for an attacker to open the
SIB. Dworwak later improved the security measures by introducing honey trap LSIB [4]. Attacker’s attempt to unlock
a trap SIB causes locking another trap SIB; that in turn, makes attacker keep opening the trap because assuming
success in guessing the secret key, but keys are wrong. In 2015, Liu et al. [5] proposed a secret key generation
technique using LFSR. He showed that it would take a hundred years for the attacker to guess the secret key even if
attackers employ brute force. A common disadvantage of methods presented by Dworwak [3], and Liu [5] is the use
of a static secret key. Although the secret key can be kept in a secure location with encryption protection, sill attackers
can use it to unlock the SIB and access instrument behind it once the key is known. To overcome this problem,
Baranowski proposes a dynamic secret key generation using hash core [6]. It solves the primary drawback of the static
key at the cost of additional routing congestion. This congestion depends on the location of the hash core related to
the SIB. The second problem of Baranowski’s method is scalability as it requires an external memory to store the
generated key. For more complex systems, the routing congestion will become worse until the point it is not favourable
anymore. In 2016, Sudeendra [7] proposed a method to overcome the scalability problem by using PUF for secret key
generation and comparing it with the secret key generated by LFSR after a certain cycle. This technique gives a double
layer of protection and solves routing congestion because it doesn’t need external memory to keep the secret key. All
the methods mentioned above did not consider what will happen when the attacker finally breaks the secret key and
get access to the instrument. In fact, attackers may gain access to the test data output which might contain confidential
data such as chip ID or useful data for reverse engineering the chip. To overcome this problem echeloned IJTAG data
protection was proposed in [8]. They implement two Cipher Cores to encrypt both the Test Data Input (TDI) and Test
Data Output (TDO) of the instrument. However, the presence of two Cipher can create excessive use of silicon area.
Additionally, there is no need to encrypt the data input as it already stated clearly on the ICL/PDL file. The TDI
encryption also means that it will take longer to test the system because the input data need to be decrypted before
being shifted into the instrument.
TAP
Controller
Instrument
Instrument
SIB
SIB
InstrumentSIB
Figure 1. IJTAG network with SIB and 3 instruments
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3. Proposed Security Mechanism
3.1. Bimodal Physically Unclonable function
In 2002 Pappu et al., introduced a physical one-way function that can be used to provide signature or identity for
electronic devices [9]. The initial Pappu’s work gradually developed as a way to generate a secret key for
authentication and encryption that is now becoming known widely as Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). PUF
has many properties that make it suitable for reproducibility and uniqueness. For instance, when a PUF is given an
input twice, it can generate a different response to each, depends on its reproducibility.
On the other hand, when a single challenge is given to two different PUFs, the two PUFs generate two different
responses, depends on the PUF’s uniqueness. This two parameters of PUF was produced as a side effect of
manufacturing variance when the device was manufactured, such as variation in the transistors’ length, widths, and
thickness. There are a number of PUFs already proposed in the literature, which is nicely elaborated in [10].
In this work, a new class of PUF is developed so that it can generate two different responses from a single
challenge. Hence, we call it bimodal PUF. A challenge is a bit string to choose which part of the PUF circuit to be
compared to generate one bit of response. The bimodal PUF is based on a ring oscillator network because it can be
easily implemented on any digital circuit. To overcome the problem of temperature variation, we are using comparison
methodology as in [11]. To prevent machine learning attack, challenge generator based on LFSR utilised as in [12].
A de-multiplexer is added at the output of PUF to split the response in half which is needed to create the bimodality
feature of the proposed PUF. The block diagram of the bimodal PUF is as in fig. 2.
Table 2 presents three possible PUF networks that can be employed as candidates to develop added-security for
IJTAG system. In the first option, two regular PUF networks can be utilised to generate two different responses, one
to unlock SIB and the other one to obfuscate the output data. The advantage of such PUFs is making harder for an
unauthorised user to unlock the SIBs because of involving two challenges. SIB is unlocked if only responses to both
challenges are correct. It; however, has the disadvantage of occupying a more extensive silicon area when
implemented in VLSI devices. Additionally, it suffers from a slower response for unlocking by the authorised user
because requiring more IJTAG clock to shift both challenges to the PUF. The block diagram of this method is shown
in Fig. 3(a).
The second option is by only using single PUF that can generate two different response, which is the bimodal PUF.
The first response is used to unlock the SIB, and the second response from the same challenge is used to obfuscate the
output data. To de-obfuscate the output data, LFSR is employed to generate the secret key for it. The user needs to
provide a correct number of cycles for LFSR to generate a signal that matches the second PUF response. The advantage
of this method is that it will only use a small area of silicon compared to the first method. The shortage of this technique
is that it is easier for an unauthorised user to unlock the SIB because it won’t compare the PUF response to open the
Figure 2. RO-based bimodal PUF
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SIB as the first method. But still, even if the attacker successfully unlocks the SIB, they still need to provide a cycle
for LFSR, which would be hard to guess. The block diagram for this method is shown in Fig. 3 (b).
Table 2.Comparison between PUF Options
Type of PUF PRO CON
2 PUF, 2 Response, 2 functionality Harder to unlock by an attacker Larger silicon area
1 PUF, 2 Response, 2 functionality Smaller silicon area Still, need further development
1 PUF, 1 Response, 2 Functionality Smaller silicon area Relatively Faster to unlock
The third option is to use a single regular PUF that requires just producing a single response from a challenge. In
this method, the single response used for both SIB unlocking and data obfuscation. To de-obfuscate the data, the user
needs to provide a number of cycles for LFSR required to generate the secret key. The advantage of this method is
that it will only use a small area of silicon, faster to unlock by an authorised user; but still, it provides protection as
good as the second option. The block diagram of this approach is shown in Fig. 3(c).
In this paper, we are focusing on using the bimodal PUF to secure the IJTAG network, as in fig.3 (a) because it is
the most balance option between security, area utilization, and speed.
3.2. Encryption VS Obfuscation
In this paper, the output data is obfuscated to make it secure from any unauthorised parties who may use it illegally
for purposes such as stealing confidential data or acquiring the logic of the instrument for reverse engineering. An
encryption-based data obfuscation, as suggested by this paper, provides higher security for data output in comparison
with the conventional straight-forward encryption techniques. A shortage of the conventional encryption techniques
is that attackers are usually able to recognise if the data is encrypted or not and then plan technique to break the
encryption. Hence, straight-forward encryption technique alone is not a good option to secure the output data.
Encryption-based data obfuscation, on the other hand, produces readable data but in an obfuscated form so that it is
delivered as a wrong data if not de-obfuscated. The attacker won’t realise data is being obfuscated and so assume it is
what they expect from the instrument. Even if the attacker intends to inject signal to activate hardware Trojan hidden
inside the instrument, the output of hardware Trojan will not affect the other instruments as the signal is obfuscated.
Figure 3. Multi-layer security mechanism for embedded instrument. (a) Using 2 regular PUF. (b) Using bimodal PUF.
(c) Using 1 regular PUF
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4. Security Analysis
In this section, the time needed to unlock the SIB and de-obfuscate the output data will be discussed. For the
authorised user who has the right challenge to unlock the SIB and a proper number of the cycles for LFSR, unlocking
process takes N number of clocks. N accounts as the total clocks needed to get the TAP controller ready, and shift the
challenge to the PUF. In general, it requires five clocks to get the TAP controller ready (TRST) followed with the
same amount of consecutive clocks as what was used to shift the challenge to the PUF. If the challenge generates a
correct response for SIB unlocking, data is directly shifted into SIB, which needs two additional clock cycles. Thus,
to unlock the SIB, it will take N+2 IJTAG clock. The PUF challenge can be simply increased with the trade-off of
silicon overhead for cases that require higher security level from this mechanism. For the unauthorised user, the
following two scenarios can be considered:
• If the attacker succeeds to guess the challenge for PUF but has no idea about obfuscation provided by the second
PUF response, they will never get the correct output data from the instrument. Thus the extracted data cannot be
used for reverse engineering. Even if hardware Trojan activation command is shifted to the instrument, the output
will not affect another instrument as the output data was obfuscated.
• If the attacker knows that LFSR is incorporated to de-obfuscate the output data, they still need a lot of time to
guess the length of LFSR and number of cycle to generate a signal that matches the second response of the PUF.
The author of [5] has analytically proven that it will take years to guess the LFSR.
With this layered security protocol, not only it will prevent the instrument to be accessed by an unauthorised
party, but it will also preclude the use of stolen data. It also protects another instrument from the effect of Hardware
Trojan activation.
5. Experiment and Results
In this experiment, Kintex-7 XC7K325T-2FFG900C FPGA from Xilinx is used for implementation with an aim
to verify the performance of the proposed techniques. In this regard, bimodal PUF and LSFR are the main blocks that
should be implemented in the FPGA. The bimodal PUF that we are using here is a ring oscillator based PUF based on
the architecture given in the reference [11] and [12]. The bimodal PUF comprises from 16 pair ring oscillators network
needed to create 2×64-bit PUF response.
It is essential for the proposed method to store the responses of PUF in a memory (flip-flops in the actual system)
mainly to hold the response until when the instrument releases the output data. The PUF responses are released from
memory at the rising edge of TCK, and then further processed in conjunction with data to generate the obfuscated
output. LFSR signal should be appropriately provided to get the data de-obfuscated back; otherwise, the obfuscated
data is transmitted out. In the other word, a device enhanced with the proposed security remains locked and produces
obscured data while the data is still readable. It is the user that should provide the right challenge to get the system
unlocked and output data de-obfuscated. This requires the user to give a correct number of cycle of LFSR to generate
the relevant signals. In our experiment, a 64-bit LFSR is used to match the 64-bit PUF response. If the unauthorised
party cannot provide a correct number of the cycles for LFSR, the output data will be obfuscated even more.
The system is implemented in VHDL and verified using Vivado 2017.4. For comparison, the proposed design is
also performed using 8, 16, 32, 64-bit PUF response to see the area impact of the design as it can be seen in table 3.
Table 3. FPGA resources for BIST with proposed IJTAG security protocol
Number of bits Slice LUTs Flip-flop % area overhead
8 4354 17416 1220 0.734
16 4360 17440 1240 1.008
32 4368 17472 1280 1.010
64 4384 17536 1360 1.414
Column 5 of table 3 show the percentage LUTs usage which compares BIST implementation using standard IJTAG
with BIST implementation using the proposed method. Compared to the result in [7], it is apparent that using the same
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primitives to secure the IJTAG network, the proposed design is not much affecting LUTs usage of FPGA, but have
an advantage of secure output data by implementation of obfuscation. Therefore, it can also conclude that it will not
much-affecting silicon area usage when implemented on ASIC.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a multilayer security mechanism to protect access and data read of IJTAG network using bimodal
PUF is proposed. The proposed technique benefits from a single challenge to generate two responses that are used to
unlock the hardware, and obfuscate the output data. The user should provide an appropriate LFSR signal to get the
output de-obfuscated back; otherwise, output data won’t be meaningful but still readable which makes hackers assume
getting access to the data they wanted. Hence utilisation of PUF to obfuscate the output data gives a high level of data
protection. The analysis shows that it is faster to unlock when accessed by the authorised party, compared to previous
work in this area. This means the time needed for testing will be faster while maintaining its security. Use of PUF for
generating secret keys also adds to the advantages as each chip has its unique characteristic due to process variation
which can be used to create a dynamic key for every single chip.
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